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Abstract 
The perception of the effectiveness of instrumental actions is influenced by depressed mood. 
Depressive realism (DR) is the claim that depressed people are particularly accurate in 
evaluating instrumentality. In two experiments, the authors tested the DR hypothesis using an 
action–outcome contingency judgment task. DR effects were a function of intertrial interval 
length and outcome density, suggesting that depressed mood is accompanied by reduced 
contextual processing rather than increased judgment accuracy. The DR effect was observed 
only when participants were exposed to extended periods in which no actions or outcomes 
occurred. This implies that DR may result from an impairment in contextual 
processing rather than accurate but negative expectations. Therefore, DR is consistent with a 
cognitive distortion view of depression. 
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Cognitive theories of depression postulate the existence of a negative self-referent 
cognitive bias that results in a systematic distortion of reality and, consequently, depressive 
symptomatology (Beck, 1967). Although considerable evidence supports this view (for detailed 
reviews, see Coyne & Gotlib, 1983; Gotlib, Kurtzman, & Blehar, 1997; Teasdale & Barnard, 
1993; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997), some research has shown that depression 
can also lead to more realistic cognitions (e.g., Lewinsohn, Mischel, Chaplin, & Barton, 1980). 
The strongest evidence for depressive realism (DR) is argued to come from contingency 
judgment tasks, as these contain an objective measure of reality with which  judgments made by 
depressed people may be compared (Ackermann & DeRubeis, 1991; Clark, Beck, & Alford, 
1999; Dobson & Franche, 1989). 
Using this methodology, Alloy and Abramson (1979) found that nondepressed people are 
more likely than depressed people to think that outcomes are contingent on their actions when 
they are not. They concluded that in comparison to depressed people, whose perceptions are 
apparently accurate, nondepressed people distort reality in an optimistic fashion. One 
interpretation of DR is that nondepressed people possess a positive bias, which allows them to 
feel in control of their environment. Evidence derived from the normal population
1
 appears to 
support this conclusion, because random samples also exhibit a tendency to overestimate 
relationships between noncontingent events (Dickinson, Shanks, & Evenden, 1984), although 
this is not always the case (e.g., Wasserman, Elek, Chatlosh, & Baker, 1993). 
In the following review of the literature, we describe contingency judgment methodology 
before reviewing evidence and theoretical explanations for DR in contingency judgment. We 
then report evidence suggesting that features of experimental tasks that encourage participants to 
integrate all available information into their judgments are responsible for patterns of bias in 
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nondepressed individuals. We further suggest that DR effects occur because depressed people do 
not use all the available evidence to arrive at their judgments rather than because they are being 
realistic. We then report the findings of two experiments that support these hypotheses. 
Contingency Judgment 
People who can accurately judge when outcomes are contingent on their actions can 
control the occurrence of outcomes or discontinue inappropriate behavior. Another type of 
judgment concerns predicting whether one event is contingent on the occurrence of a preceding 
event. There is value in the ability to learn both types of relationship. In empirical tasks, both 
types of judgment involve the experimenter programming a series of response- or event-
contingent outcomes and asking participants to judge the degree to which the response or event 
predicts or causes the outcome. Judgments can then be compared with the actual degree of 
contingency by calculating one of several similar contingency metrics (see Allan, 1980, and 
Crocker, 1981, for discussions of appropriate measures) that, it is argued, constitute an objective 
measure of reality (Ackermann & DeRubeis, 1991). 
The response–outcome contingency judgment task used in many DR studies can be 
summarized as follows. Participants are given multiple opportunities to press (or not press) a 
button, which sometimes produces an outcome (e.g., light onset), depending on the programmed 
contingency. If the light switches on more often in the presence of the response than in its 
absence, participants should learn that they have some control over light onset. There are four 
possible types of event–outcome conjunctions, which can be summarized in a 2 × 2 contingency 
table (see Table 1) and used to calculate a contingency metric (P; Allan, 1980). The response–
outcome contingency is simply the probability of outcome given the response [P(O/R)] minus 
the probability of the outcome given no response [P(O/no R)]. The different levels of 
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contingency can include no control (zero contingency) or some degree of control (positive 
contingency) over the outcome (see Table 1). Therefore, P is one objective measure with which 
participants’ judgments of their degree of control can be compared. 
DR in Contingency Judgment Studies 
Early experimental work on contingency judgments suggested that people in general 
were not accurate estimators of contingency because their judgments deviated from P (e.g., L. 
J. Chapman & Chapman, 1967; Smedslund, 1963). However, Alloy and Abramson (1979) 
claimed that depression may actually increase accuracy. In one experiment, they exposed 
participants to one of two conditions, both of which involved a zero contingency between button 
pressing and light illumination. In other words, pressing the button had no impact on the 
likelihood of the light switching on. The two conditions differed, however, as to the frequency 
(density) with which the outcome occurred. In the low- and high-density conditions, the outcome 
occurred 25% and 75% of the time, respectively (see Table 1). If participants were accurate or 
“realistic,” then both conditions should be judged similarly because even though the absolute 
number of outcomes differed across conditions, the overall contingency remained constant. The 
results showed that although nondepressed people’s judgments of control were higher as the 
number of outcomes increased, depressed people’s judgments were not. This increase in 
nondepressed people’s judgments, which occurs in conditions of high outcome density (OD), has 
been interpreted as an optimistic bias. The lack of OD bias on the part of depressed participants 
purportedly reflected their tendency to be more realistic in their perceptions.
2
 
The effect has been replicated using different protocols in which responding does not 
control the outcome (zero contingencies) but the outcome occurs frequently (Alloy, Abramson, 
& Kossman, 1985; Benassi & Mahler, 1985; Martin, Abramson, & Alloy, 1984; Vasquez, 1987). 
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There is little evidence so far that this is a general difference in contingency learning, because 
with positive contingencies in which the participant does have control over the outcome, no 
differences between depressed and nondepressed people have been reported (Alloy et al., 1985; 
Carson, 2001; Cobbs, Critelli, & Tang, 1990;  Ee, 1994; <cr32>Lennox, Bedell, Abramson, 
Raps, & Foley, 1990; Vasquez, 1987). 
A number of theoretical accounts have been advanced to explain why the effect depends 
on zero contingencies. For example, zero contingencies may fit in with depressed people’s 
expectations of having no control over events, producing the apparently more realistic pattern of 
judgments (Alloy & Abramson, 1979). However, nondepressed people are argued to have higher 
expectations of control in such conditions, and their higher judgments accord with this finding. 
Additionally, nondepressed people may be motivated to maintain their self-esteem, which is 
associated with having control over events, producing higher judgments of control in zero 
contingencies. The suggestion is that this motivation is simply not present in depressed people 
(Ackermann & DeRubeis, 1991). Either or both motivational and expectations factors could 
contribute to the observed DR effect. Furthermore, these explanations for DR concur with 
evidence of no mood difference when positive contingencies are tested. 
However, there is no adequate account explaining why the DR effect only appears in 
conditions with high OD. There is a suggestion that the frequency of occurrence could influence 
the outcome’s perceived valence (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979, p. 462), which would 
subsequently reduce mood differences. The evidence for this view, however, is anecdotal, and it 
could be argued that that any similarity between depressed and nondepressed people’s judgments 
in zero contingency conditions remains problematic for purely expectations and motivational 
accounts of DR. 
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OD Effects in the Normal Population 
The idea that expectations about specific scenarios determine participants’ judgments has 
not been restricted to the DR literature (Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984). Random samples of the 
population show a strong tendency to overestimate high-density contingencies not only in control 
tasks, sometimes referred to as operant tasks (Dickinson et al., 1984), but also predictive tasks in 
which participants judge relationships between symptoms and diagnoses (L. J. Chapman & 
Chapman, 1967). Alloy and Tabachnik (1984) argued that in both situations, participants have 
strong a priori expectations that events are associated. Further support for this view comes from a 
DR study in which predictive contingencies were arranged between appearances of colored 
shapes on a screen (Alloy et al., 1985). Judgments in this task were argued to be uninfluenced by 
expectations and no difference was found between depressed and nondepressed people’s 
judgments of a high-density zero contingency. This was interpreted as support for the theory that 
judgments are not simply determined by statistical contingency but also by the expectations that 
participants hold regarding a given experimental situation. 
However, we feel that this explanation and expectations-driven theory alone are 
inadequate to explain OD effects and consequently DR. This is because evidence suggests that 
task structure also determines whether OD effects occur. The studies mentioned above are 
similar in that contingency information is presented to participants using discrete trials. Each 
event–outcome conjunction in the contingency table constitutes one experimental trial. Trials are 
constructed such that there is a marked period of time in which the response can occur followed 
by a period in which the outcome can occur. Studies finding evidence of both OD and DR effects 
have used this type of discrete trials procedure, where each trial is separated from the next by an 
intertrial interval (ITI). 
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Of particular relevance to this discussion is evidence from other sequential tasks in which 
no OD bias was observed. For example, Allan and Jenkins (1980, 1983) used an operant discrete 
trials procedure that did not contain an ITI and found no evidence of OD bias in several 
experiments. Similarly, Wasserman, Chatlosh, and Neunaber (1983) developed a free-operant 
procedure without an ITI, where participants were free to make or withhold their responses at 
any time during the task. To program the contingency, Wasserman et al. segmented the task into 
unsignalled, 1-s time bins. At the end of each bin, the experimental program recorded whether a 
response had been made and an outcome occurred at the programmed probability. Using this 
procedure, Wasserman et al. (1993) examined ratings of multiple positive, negative, and zero 
contingency conditions and found that judgments were highly correlated with P (r = .98). There 
was no evidence of judgments increasing with higher levels of OD. Therefore, judgments were 
highly accurate in tasks that according to Alloy and Tabachnik (1984) should have produced 
patterns of optimistic bias. 
In summary, the contingency judgment experiments we have just described can be 
roughly categorized into three types: those that use a discrete trials procedure with an ITI, those 
that use a discrete trials procedure without an ITI, and those that use a free-operant procedure. 
Those studies in which an OD bias was observed (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Dickinson et 
al., 1984) used a discrete trials version of the tasks containing an ITI. However, OD bias is not 
observed when a discrete trials task with no ITI (Allan & Jenkins, 1980) or a free-operant 
procedure is used (Wasserman et al., 1993). According to the expectations-based account, these 
three procedures should not affect the a priori expectations governing judgments because the 
scenarios are identical. 
 Msetfi_JEP_2005.doc 9 
 
It could be argued that judgments in free-operant tasks are not susceptible to OD bias 
because responses and outcomes are more temporally contiguous. Learning is facilitated when 
there is a shorter delay between an event and its outcome (Shanks, Pearson, & Dickinson, 1989). 
However, this aspect of task structure is not likely to be responsible for the different patterns of 
OD effects across tasks. For example, Allan and Jenkins (1980) found no evidence for OD 
effects using a discrete trials, operant procedure that involved weak temporal contiguity. 
However, in their study, trials were not separated by an ITI. Thus it would seem that the critical 
difference between experimental conditions that do elicit OD bias and those that do not is the 
presence or absence of an ITI. 
This further suggests that the optimism of nondepressed people or, to put it more 
accurately, OD bias is not simply contingency and scenario dependent but also ITI dependent. It 
would seem that because the presence of OD bias in nondepressed people is the basis of the DR 
effect, exploring the underlying cause of OD bias and its ITI dependence might also elucidate the 
reasons as to why depressed people do not show the effect. 
The ITI Hypothesis and DR 
The ITI is a period of time in which the participant simply waits for the next trial and 
nothing happens. However, we propose that ITIs are also periods of time in which the participant 
is exposed to the experimental context in the absence of the occurrence of the outcome. In other 
words, ITIs could be conceptualized as no response–no outcome trials and as such are similar to 
events contained in Cell D of the contingency table. Cell D events happen when the response and 
the outcome do not occur in the experimental context. If ITIs were integrated into the 
contingency calculation as Cell D trials, this would be predicted to reduce the probability of 
outcome in the absence of the response. Consequently, integrating ITIs into the contingency 
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calculation can produce radically different predictions of OD bias at both zero and positive levels 
of contingency (see also Baker, Murphy, Vallee-Tourangeau, & Mehta, 2001). 
The basis for this prediction can be explored with reference to the two zero contingency 
conditions where OD and DR effects are traditionally observed (see Figure 1).<fgc> Recall that 
both conditions involved presenting the event–outcome conjunctions over 40 trials with 40 ITIs 
(including one at the end). The upper pane of Figure 1 shows how the contingency for both 
conditions is calculated in the usual manner and the lower pane shows the effect of adding 40 ITI 
or Cell D events. In both density conditions, adding to the D cell involves a reduction in the 
P(O/no R), such that it is lower than the P(O/R). This leaves both contingencies as positive, with 
the high-density condition being more positive than the low-density condition. The absolute 
values of P calculated with these modified cell frequencies would of course depend on how 
many D cells were added. However, any addition reduces the P(O/no R), thereby increasing P. 
It may seem arbitrary to add exactly 40 extra Cell D events; however, any number added to this 
cell will have the same effect on the relative ordering of the contingencies. Thus, including ITIs 
in the contingency calculation produces predictions of OD effects. 
The long ITI predictions are similar to the magnitude of judgments made by 
nondepressed people in the same conditions (Alloy & Abramson, 1979). This suggests that when 
contingencies are judged in no-ITI situations, judgments are consistent with the programmed P 
(e.g., Wasserman et al., 1993). However, when ITIs are used, the response–no outcome 
information is included, producing higher judgments of control with higher levels of OD. This 
accounts for the discrepancy in OD effects between judgments derived from procedures with 
different trial structures. 
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If nondepressed people’s judgments fluctuate as a function of ITI length to produce OD 
effects, one implication is that depressed people’s judgments are not influenced by this factor. 
The literature supports this argument because researchers running DR studies have used 
procedures containing particularly long ITIs. For example, Alloy and Abramson (1979) used a 
variable ITI with a mean length of 14 s. In one study, which did not replicate the DR effect, 
relatively shorter ITIs of 2 s were used (e.g., Dobson & Pusch, 1995). Our analysis suggests that 
whereas nondepressed people integrate ITIs into their perception of contingency, thereby 
increasing judgments of control, depressed people do so to a lesser extent. Given that such 
integration might be seen as normative, concepts of depressive performance as realistic may well 
need to be reassessed. 
However, is there any other reason to suppose this might be the case, apart from the 
analysis that we have advanced? Depressive symptomatology includes not only affective aspects 
but also cognitive features, such as attention and concentration difficulties (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994). Extended waiting periods occurring during the ITI might induce difficulties 
in maintaining attention, such that context information is not processed adequately. This would 
be less problematic during the experimental trials because the participant must perform an action 
and observe the outcome, and thus attention would be more focused. A related possibility 
involves the fact that depressed people have a tendency to engage in self- and symptom-focused 
ruminative thought (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). It has been found that high levels of rumination 
are associated with impaired concentration and attention caused by a tendency for thoughts to 
wander and drift. This was evidenced by poor reading and reading comprehension as well as 
poor lecture comprehension performance in dysphorics induced to ruminate (Lyubomirsky, 
Kasri, & Zehm, 2003). This evidence suggests that people who are not clinically depressed, such 
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as the depressed participants in Alloy and Abramson’s (1979) study, might have difficulty 
maintaining their attention through ITI periods and thus process this information differently than 
nondepressed people would. Although evidence currently available supports our analysis, no 
studies have directly tested our interpretation of the DR effect. We present two experiments 
systematically testing the effect of varying ITI length on OD bias and the DR effect. 
Experiment 1 
The first experiment was designed to test our prediction that varying the length of the ITI 
in a discrete trials procedure would substantially influence judgments in a high-density zero 
contingency condition. Furthermore, we predicted that this manipulation would influence 
nondepressed participants but not depressed participants. Participants were presented with 
contingency problems, modeled on the original Alloy and Abramson (1979) task, in which they 
judged the extent to which their pressing of a button controlled the onset of a light. To examine 
whether any difference in judgments attributable to ITI length was a function of the temporal 
contiguity between response and outcome, we also collected reaction time data. 
Method 
Participants. University students were recruited for this experiment using a mass 
screening method. All volunteers were required to complete the BDI (Beck et al., 1961) before 
being invited to participate. The resulting sample (N = 128) was selected on the basis of 
volunteers’ BDI scores, with the constraint that there should be equal numbers of depressed and 
nondepressed male and female participants. Participants completed the BDI again during the 
experiment and, as in Alloy and Abramson (1979), were assigned to the depressed group (scores 
of 9 or above, n = 64) or the nondepressed group (scores of 8 or below, n = 64). Participants 
were then pseudo-randomly assigned to the four experimental conditions, with the constraint that 
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there should be equal numbers of male and female participants in each group. As the procedure 
was not fully randomized—depressive status is a nonrandom factor—the groups were matched 
on potential confounds such as working memory capacity, IQ, age, and levels of educational 
achievement, which could have contributed to any between-groups effects. Working memory 
capacity was measured using the digit span test (forward version; Lezak, 1995), and IQ was 
measured using the National Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson, 1982). The NART provides a 
well-validated estimate of IQ and is commonly used as an estimate of premorbid IQ in control 
and psychiatric populations (Crawford, Deary, Starr, & Whalley, 2001). These data were 
analyzed with a factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) including all the experimental 
conditions described below. The nondepressed groups (M = 4.20, SE = 0.32) had significantly 
lower BDI scores than did the depressed groups (M = 15.00, SE = 0.84), F(1, 112) = 151.62, p < 
.001, MSE = 24.60. There was significant variability between the experimental groups on years 
of education, F(1, 112) = 11.18, p = .001, MSE = 4.48; digit span, F(1, 112) = 4.82, p = .03, MSE 
= 1.56; and NART scores, F(1, 112) = 5.38, p = .022, MSE = 34.18. Therefore, these factors 
were included in subsequent data analyses as covariates. 
Design. In this experiment, we used a 2 (mood) × 2 (ITI length) × 2 (possibility of 
outcome) × 2 (sex) fully factorial between-subjects design. A computerized version of the 
contingency judgment task used by Alloy and Abramson (1979) was used. Participants were 
asked to judge the extent of their control over light onset on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 = no 
control and 100 = total control. Intermediate values represented varying degrees of partial 
control. The task was a high-density zero contingency condition (.75/.75). The experimental 
conditions differed as to whether the ITI was short (3 s) or long (15 s) and whether the 
participants’ mood was depressed or not depressed. Given that Alloy and Abramson (1979) 
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found that the DR effect was stronger in women than in men, sex was included as a factor in all 
analyses to ensure that it did not moderate ITI effects. In the original DR experiments, 
presentation of stimuli was not computerized, thus the lightbulb was visible to participants 
during the ITI. In computerized contingency judgment procedures, the computer screen is 
usually blank during the ITI. Thus, for generality, we also manipulated whether the ITI was 
marked by the presence of the lightbulb (outcome possible) or a blank screen (outcome not 
possible). The effect of ITI length might also be confounded by the speed with which 
participants respond during the allowed interval. Therefore, reaction time data were collected to 
discount the possibility. 
Apparatus. Presentation of experimental events was programmed using a Macintosh 
computer and Real Basic (Version 3) software. 
Procedure. Participants were briefed verbally as to the nature of the experiment and 
given a written information sheet to read. After giving informed consent, participants completed 
the digit span test, the NART, and the BDI. Participants were then given instructions, displayed 
on the computer screen, on the task requirements. They were asked to judge how much control 
their pressing of a button had over a light switching on. They were further instructed upon the 
necessity of pressing the button on some occasions but not pressing the button on an 
approximately equal number of occasions. The task was presented on a computer screen, and 
each trial was constructed such that there was a 3-s opportunity for the participants to make their 
response by pressing the space bar. This period was signaled by an on-screen message saying, 
“You may press the button now!” This was followed by a 2-s period in which the lightbulb 
graphic either switched on or remained off. Each trial was followed by an ITI period, during 
which the unlit lightbulb either remained on the screen (outcome-possible condition) or the 
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screen went blank (outcome-not-possible condition). The probability of light onset, both when 
the button was pressed and when the button was not pressed, was .75. Judgments were made 
after the 40 experimental trials had been completed. Participants were then debriefed. 
Results and Discussion 
Both the judgments of control and the reaction time data were analyzed using a between-
subjects ANOVA with mood (nondepressed, depressed), ITI (short, long), possibility of outcome 
(possible, not possible), and sex (female, male) as between-subjects factors. Years of education, 
digit span, and NART scores were included in both analyses as covariates. An alpha level of .05 
was used in all statistical tests except in unplanned comparisons where the alpha level was 
adjusted using the Bonferroni correction procedure ( = .05/number of comparisons). 
Judgments of control. Nondepressed participants appeared to make higher judgments in 
the long ITI than in the short ITI conditions, whereas depressed participants did not (see Figure 
2). Signaling the ITI with either a blank screen (outcome not possible) or the lightbulb remaining 
on the screen (outcome possible) appeared to have no effect on judgments, so we chose not to 
display the data by this factor. 
The analysis confirmed these observations. Although none of the main effects were 
reliable (all ps > .29, all 2s < .01), the interaction between mood and ITI length did suggest that 
the two mood groups responded differently to the ITI manipulation, F(1, 109) = 7.30, p = .008, 
2 = .06, MSE = 936.48. Although the nondepressed people’s judgments were influenced by the 
ITI manipulation, the depressed people’s judgments were not. Two planned comparisons support 
this assertion. Nondepressed participants’ judgments of control were significantly higher in the 
long than in the short ITI conditions, F(1, 109) = 7.97, p = .006, 2 = .03, MSE = 936.48, 
whereas depressed participants’ judgments did not differ across the two ITI conditions, F(1, 109) 
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= 1.85, p = .178, 2 = .006, MSE = 936.48. We also conducted two further post hoc comparisons 
with an alpha level adjusted to .025. Both comparisons just failed to reach this conservative 
criterion. When the ITI length was short, depressed participants appeared to make higher 
judgments than nondepressed participants did, F(1, 109) = 5.18, p = .025, 2 = .02, MSE = 
936.48, and in long ITI conditions, nondepressed people’s judgments were not significantly 
higher than depressed people’s judgments, F(1, 109) = 3.63, p = .059, 2 = .01, MSE = 936.48. 
The ITI × Mood interaction was not related to the effect of sex, F(1, 109) = 1.75, p = .188, 2 = 
.02, MSE = 936.48, or the possibility of outcome occurrence (p = .74, 2 = .001), and the four-
way interaction was not significant (p = .96, 2 < .001). This pattern of findings indicates that the 
interaction between mood and ITI length is caused by the increase in nondepressed people’s 
judgments of control with longer ITIs, whereas depressed people’s judgments were not 
influenced by this factor. 
Reaction time data. An average response time (in milliseconds) was calculated for each 
participant; however, the data for 2 participants were lost due to computer malfunction. The 
analysis showed that ITI length did not influence reaction times, F(1, 107) = 0.43, p = .51, 2 = 
.004, MSE = 79,193.23. None of the other main effects (all ps > .34, all 2s < .008) or 
interactions were reliable except the effect of the possibility of the outcome, F(1, 107) = 13.16, p 
< .001, 2 = .11, MSE = 79,193.23. Participants pressed the button faster (M = 974.96 ms, SE = 
38.62) when the occurrence of the outcome was possible than when it was not possible (M = 
1,160.84 ms, SE = 32.44). This suggests that the when the lightbulb remained on the screen 
during the ITI, participants maintained attention to the screen such that they could respond faster 
during the allowed interval. 
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Covariates. Years of education, digit span, and NART scores did not influence control 
judgments (all ps > .15, all 2s < .01). Digit span and NART scores did not influence reaction 
time (all ps > .63, all 2s = .002). However, higher levels of education were related to longer 
reaction times, F(1, 107) = 7.74, p = .006, 2 = .07, MSE = 79,193.23, where 1 = 24.32. 
Because the covariate extracts this factor from the overall analysis, this finding will not be 
discussed further. 
In summary, the results showed that nondepressed participants made higher judgments of 
control in a high-density zero contingency condition than depressed participants did. However, 
we found that this difference was influenced by the extent to which participants were exposed to 
a period of time in which nothing happened during the ITI. Nondepressed people’s judgments in 
the long ITI condition were higher than short ITI judgments inthe same condition, where the 
experimental trials contained an identical programmed contingency. One possible explanation 
for the difference may have to do with the speed with which participants made a response. 
Responding faster reduces the temporal contiguity between the response and the outcome, which 
in turn might have reduced the perception of contingency between responding and outcome. 
However, there was no evidence for this, as there was no relationship between reaction time and 
mood state or ITI. 
The findings of Experiment 1 support our hypothesis that nondepressed people integrate 
ITIs into their judgments whereas depressed people do not. We proposed an analysis of this 
effect where ITIs might be perceived as response–no outcome trials for the contingency 
calculation. The increase in nondepressed people’s judgments of control in long ITI conditions is 
certainly consistent with the hypothesis that the length of the ITI has some effect on producing 
OD bias. However, it is also quite possible that longer ITIs might produce higher judgments in 
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general. Because only a high-density condition was used in Experiment 1, this evidence might 
not be seen as sufficient to confirm the role of the ITI in OD bias. Therefore, a further 
experiment was carried out to extend and replicate the novel findings of Experiment 1, in which 
both high- and low-density zero contingency conditions were tested. Also, given that participants 
might have strong a priori expectations regarding the efficacy of responding with regard to light 
onset, the task scenario was adjusted to reduce such expectations. 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants. Participants were recruited in the same manner as in the previous 
experiment and were assigned to depressed (n = 48) and nondepressed (n = 48) groups on the 
same basis as were participants in Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, control data were collected 
from each participant. This was analyzed with a factorial ANOVA including the same factors as 
described in the Design section. Groups were successfully matched on sex, digit span, and age, 
but there was significant variability between groups on NART scores, F(1, 80) = 4.41, p = .04, 
MSE = 46.38, and years of education, F(1, 80) = 5.25, p = .025, MSE = 4.83. Therefore, 
subsequent data analysis included these factors as covariates. BDI scores were higher in the 
depressed groups (M = 16.52, SE = .32) than in the nondepressed groups (M = 4.19, SE = .34), 
F(1, 80) = 129.37, p < .001, MSE = 28.19. 
Design. In this experiment, we used a 2 (mood) × 2 (ITI length) × 2 (OD) × 2 (sex) fully 
factorial between-subjects design. The judgment task was the same as that used in Experiment 1, 
but now participants could be judging either a high-density zero contingency (.75/.75) or a low-
density zero contingency (.25/25). 
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Procedure. The procedure was similar to that outlined in Experiment 1 except that the 
lightbulb was always present on the screen during the ITI. A modification was made to the 
instructions to reduce any influence of positive prior expectancies regarding light switches and 
light onset. Participants were asked to imagine that they were scientists who were testing a piece 
of equipment to be used in an experiment. The equipment comprised a lightbulb wired up to a 
light switch and a power supply. They were further told that this equipment was rather old and 
there were some doubts as to its reliability. This instruction was designed to minimize 
expectations regarding response efficacy. 
Results and Discussion 
The judgments of control and reaction time data were analyzed using a between-subjects 
ANOVA with mood (nondepressed, depresssed), ITI (short, long), OD (low, high), and sex 
(female, male) as between-subjects factors. 
Judgments of control. Participants’ mean judgments in all experimental conditions are 
shown in Figure 3. The data suggest that there was no effect of ITI in low-OD conditions in 
either mood group. In high-OD conditions, nondepressed participants made higher judgments of 
control in the long ITI condition than in the short ITI condition. Their judgments were also 
higher than the depressed group’s judgments in the long ITI, high-OD condition, which is 
evidence for the DR effect. 
The ANOVA source table is displayed in Table 2. The predicted three-way interaction 
between ITI, OD, and mood was significant. Further analysis of the three-way interaction 
showed that in low-OD conditions, there were no reliable mood or ITI effects or a Mood × ITI 
interaction (all ps >.22, all 2s < .005). In high-OD conditions, however, the Mood × ITI 
interaction was significant, F(1, 78) = 12.69, p < .001, 2 = .04, MSE = 445.87. Two further 
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planned comparisons showed that although nondepressed participants’ judgments of control were 
higher in the long than in the short ITI, high-OD condition, F(1, 78) = 12.96, p < .001, 2 = .04, 
MSE = 445.87, depressed participants’ judgments did not change with ITI length, F(1, 78) = 
3.53, p = .06, 2 = .01, MSE = 445.87. 
When ITIs were short, there were no effects of density or mood and no Density × Mood 
interaction (all ps > .37, all 2s < .003), showing that neither mood group exhibited OD effects in 
short ITI conditions. However, when ITIs were long, the Mood × Density interaction was 
significant, F(1, 78) = 4.46, p = .038, 2 = .02, MSE = 445.87. To interpret this interaction, we 
carried out four further unplanned comparisons with an alpha level of .0125 adjusted using the 
same procedure as was used in Experiment 1. Further analysis of the OD effect in the long ITI 
condition revealed that whereas nondepressed people made significantly higher judgments of 
control in the high-density condition than in the low-density condition, F(1, 78) = 13.20, p = 
.005, 2 = .05, MSE = 445.87, depressed people did not (p = .55, 2 = .001). We compared 
judgments in the two density conditions separately to examine mood effects. There was no 
difference between mood groups in the low-density, long ITI condition (p = .69, 2 <.001), but 
nondepressed people’s judgments were significantly higher than depressed people’s judgments in 
the high-density, long ITI condition, F(1, 78) = 11.60, p = .001, 2 = .04, MSE = 445.87. 
Although ITI effects were not related to participants’ sex, the fact that the four-way 
interaction approached the level of significance deserves some comment. This is most likely due 
to the finding that although as predicted, both male and female participants’ judgments increased 
in a similar fashion as a function of ITI length in the important high-density condition, this effect 
appeared to be stronger in male participants (see Table 3). However, this difference was not 
reliable because in the nondepressed participants’ high-density condition, the ITI effect was 
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significant, F(1, 78) = 12.96, p < .001, 2 = .04, MSE = 445.87, whereas both the effect of sex, 
F(1, 78) = 3.18, p = .09, 2 = .01, MSE = 445.87, and the interaction between sex and ITI, F(1, 
78) = 2.28, p = .15, 2 = .007, MSE = 445.87, were not reliable. This pattern causes the 
nonsignificant four-way interaction. The overall analysis also shows that the Mood × Density × 
Sex interaction was reliable (see Table 2). This finding is not directly relevant to the subject of 
this article, but further discussion is presented in the Appendix. 
Reaction time data. The mean reaction time for all participants was 1,066.15 ms (SE = 
29.58 ms). There were no reliable effects of ITI length, F(1, 76) = 3.30, p = .07, 2 = .04; OD, 
F(1, 76) = 1.71, p = .19, 2 = .02; mood, F(1, 76) = 1.43, p = .24, 2 = .02; or sex (p = .36, 2 = 
.01), with MSE = 82,032.63. None of the interactions reached the level of significance. 
Covariates. NART scores and years of education were included as covariates in the 
overall ANOVAs conducted on the judgments of control and reaction time data. Neither factor 
influenced reaction times (ps > .54, 2s < .005), and NART scores were the only factor that 
significantly influenced judgments, F(1, 78) = 14.02, p < .01, 2 = .15, MSE = 445.87. Higher 
NART scores (corresponding with higher IQ) were related to lower judgments of control (1 = 
1.298). However, because the covariate extracts the influence of this factor from the analysis, 
this finding will not be discussed further. 
In summary, the results of Experiment 2 showed that for nondepressed participants, the 
extent to which their judgments reflect OD bias depends on the length of the ITI. This was 
because judgments of high- and low-density zero contingencies did not differ when the ITI was 
short. However, when the ITI was long, the high-density condition received significantly higher 
judgments of control than the low-density condition did. However, depressed people exhibited 
no evidence of OD bias in either the short or the long ITI conditions. Moreover, it was clear that 
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DR was only evident with long ITI conditions. This indicates that the DR effect is not simply a 
function of mood and OD (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979) but is highly influenced by the length 
of the ITI. 
General Discussion 
Previous accounts of DR and normal optimism suggest that OD effects result from 
variations in expectations and motivation elicited by various scenarios and contingencies. Our 
findings show that OD effects in nondepressed people also result from additional contingency 
information derived from the ITI. There was no evidence that ITI effects were caused by changes 
in the temporal contiguity between response and outcome. This is consistent with evidence of no 
OD bias in procedures that do not contain an ITI (e.g., Allan & Jenkins, 1980; Wasserman et al., 
1993). Our findings also supported the hypothesis that depressed people do not exhibit OD bias 
because ITI length does not influence their judgments in the same manner. Overall, the results of 
this study provide preliminary supporting evidence for the role of ITI length in OD bias and DR. 
In the remainder of the discussion, we examine the relationship between our findings and 
theories of contingency judgment and depression and address the limitations of the present 
research. 
Relationship Between the ITI Hypothesis and Theories of Contingency Learning 
The ITI hypothesis allows the P model to provide a straightforward account of OD 
effects in contingency learning. However, P is generally seen as an inadequate model because it 
cannot explain other phenomena such as cue selection effects (for detailed discussions, see 
Allan, 1993; De Houwer & Beckers, 2002; Shanks, 1993). Thus contemporary theorists have 
used associative models to describe the processes underlying contingency judgments (e.g., 
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Dickinson et al., 1984) or developed computational descriptions in addition to P (Cheng, 1997). 
The implications of the ITI hypothesis for these models are now discussed. 
Associative models. A prototypical example of an associative model is the Rescorla–
Wagner model (RWM; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). This model was originally designed to 
account for selective association phenomena in animal learning. The basic assumption of RWM 
is that associations develop between stimuli (i.e., the conditioned stimulus; CS) and the outcome 
(i.e., the unconditioned stimulus; US) after repeated pairings. It is the strength of such 
associations that are thought to underpin conditioned behavior in animals but also contingency 
learning in humans (e.g., Dickinson et al., 1984). In addition to its assumptions about discrete 
stimuli, the RWM also assumes that the experimental context gains associative strength 
independently when presented with the outcome or loses it when presented alone. The context 
and the discrete events are predicted to compete for association because outcomes can only 
support a limited amount of associative power. It is this mechanism that allows the model to be 
sensitive to CS-US contingencies in animal and human learning (e.g., Murphy & Baker, 2004; 
Rescorla, 1968). 
When the contingency involves only one response and one outcome and all events are 
held to be equally salient, predictions derived from RWM are isomorphic with P; that is, at 
asymptote, the RWM equations equate to P (G. B. Chapman & Robbins, 1990). OD effects are 
therefore somewhat problematic for the RWM, although there have been some attempts to 
explain them. For example, if the events in the contingency table are held to be of unequal 
salience, then the model can predict OD effects. For example, the RWM contains learning rate 
parameters specifying the salience of the presence and the absence of the outcome. If the 
presence of the outcome is held to be more salient than its absence, the model produces 
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predictions of negative OD effects. Low-ODconditions would then produce higher predicted 
levels of associative strength than would high-OD conditions (for details, see Wasserman et al., 
1993). If, however, the occurrence of the outcome is considered to be less salient than its 
nonoccurrence, the RWM predicts positive OD effects (Shanks, Lopez, Darby, & Dickinson, 
1996). Yet the results of the current study show that the RWM does not require parameter 
manipulation to account for ITI effects or the varying patterns of OD effects across tasks with 
different trial structures. 
This is because, similar to the way in which P can incorporate ITIs as Cell D trials, the 
RWM can integrate ITIs as context–no outcome trials. Long periods of time when the context is 
present but the outcome does not occur could be predicted to reduce the context’s association 
with the outcome, allowing the response to gain more associative strength in zero and positive 
contingency conditions (see Figure 4). 
Figure 4 (left panel) shows how RWM predictions made for conditions without ITIs 
match those of P in terms of the response–outcome relationship. In a zero contingency, the 
context gains more associative strength than the response, particularly in high-density conditions. 
The relationship between context and response is less clear in positive contingencies, where the 
context gains less strength than the response does in low-density conditions and the same amount 
of strength in high-density conditions. This pattern changes when ITIs are included in the 
model’s predictions (see the right panel of Figure 4). In both zero and positive contingencies, the 
context gains little associative strength. This allows the response to acquire associative strength, 
particularly in high-density conditions where there are more event–outcome pairings. In fact, no 
matter how the parameters are set, incorporating ITIs into the model as context–no outcome 
 Msetfi_JEP_2005.doc 25 
 
trials produces predictions of OD effects, such that higher levels of OD will result in relatively 
more positive judgments. 
Rule-based models. Although the RWM offers one theoretical framework for explaining 
the effects we have observed, it is not the only solution. Some researchers have suggested that 
people reason about cause–effect relationships by remembering all the events of the contingency 
table and calculating a statistic, similar to P, based on episodic memory (Cheng & Novick, 
1990). However, this theory has difficulty accounting for OD effects unless one assumes, like we 
have for the RWM, that extra ITIs are included in the calculation. More recently, Cheng (1997) 
has suggested that density effects reflect a secondary process related to causal reasoning and this 
is embodied in the power PC theory (PPC). In addition to P, Cheng has argued that causal 
reasoning involves the evaluation of the causal power between events. Power is driven by the 
intuition that for any cause of an effect, there are always potential alternative causes. Therefore, 
knowledge of the base rate of the effect (frequency of outcome) will enable one to contrast 
between the candidate cause and alternative causes such as the experimental context. Generative 
causal power is therefore defined not just by contingency but also by outcome contrasts. This can 
be reduced to the following equation: 
  
pi =
DP
1- P e /i ( ) ,       
(1) 
where e is the occurrence of the outcome and i is the occurrence of the event. When the putative 
cause is preventative, the denominator is simply 
  
P e /i ( ). Therefore, the power for an event to 
cause an outcome is a joint function of the overall contingency (P) and the probability of the 
outcome in the absence of the event. According to this model, higher levels of OD increase the 
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base rate of the effect and reduce the denominator of the model, producing higher levels of 
causal power overall. 
Although PPC is successful in predicting that higher levels of OD produce higher 
judgments of control in positive and negative contingency conditions (Cheng, 1997), it cannot 
predict OD bias in a zero contingency because the numerator of the equation is P = 0. In other 
words, power is always equal to zero. However, Cheng (1997) argued that participants 
misperceive a zero contingency as either slightly positive or slightly negative, allowing the 
equation to predict OD bias. This might occur in the situation of a within-subjects design, where 
participants judge multiple contingency problems and prior contingencies might produce 
proactive interference with subsequent contingencies (e.g., Baker, Berbrier, & Vallee-
Tourangeau, 1989). However, if within-subjects designs were the only source of misperception, 
OD bias should not be observed when using a between-subjects design. In the present 
experiments, and indeed in Alloy and Abramson’s (1979) study, nondepressed participants only 
judged one contingency problem and still exhibited a strong OD bias. It can therefore be argued 
that OD bias in zero contingency conditions can only be accounted for with the additional 
assumption of a misperception of ∆P. Our ITI hypothesis provides an empirically validated 
means by which a putative zero contingency might be misperceived. Therefore, both rule-based 
and associative models can predict that if ITIs are included in the perception of contingency, OD 
effects will occur at both zero and positive levels of contingency. However, the current findings 
do not allow one to decide which model provides a better account of contingency judgment. 
The ITI hypothesis and positive contingencies. We have argued that DR effects occur 
because depressed people do not integrate ITIs into their judgments. One question that arises 
from this analysis, then, is why researchers have consistently failed to find evidence for DR 
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effects in judgments derived from positive contingencies. Detecting DR effects requires testing 
in both high- and low-outcome densities of the same contingency, and we are not aware of such 
evidence with positive contingencies. Usually several different positive contingencies are 
compared. For example, Alloy and Abramson’s (1979) experiment used three positive 
contingencies (.75/0, .75/.25, and .75/.50, where the Ps were .75, .50, and .25, respectively). In 
addition, some contingencies are less influenced by changes in the D cell. For example, neither 
the RW nor the PPC models predict that differences in ITI integration would influence 
judgments of the .75/0 condition. Including extra D cells in the contingency calculation 
influences only the probability of the outcome in the absence of the response P(O/no R). 
Therefore, if the frequency of Cell C is 0, as in the positive .75 condition, this probability and the 
overall P will not change. Finally, positive contingencies in general are less influenced by 
increases in the D cell. For example, adding extra D cell events to a high-density zero 
contingency with the following conditional probabilities, P(O/R) = 1, P(O/no R) = P = 1  1 
P = 1, because the Cell D events will 
reduce the P(O/no R) toward zero. This zero contingency could potentially vary between 0 and 1 
with different ITI integration. A moderately positive high-density contingency, P(O/R) = 1, 
P P = 1  P = 1. The 
P by only .5. Therefore, the range of possible contingencies is 
smaller (.5 to 1) with positive contingencies compared with zero contingencies (0 to 1), and this 
may make them less sensitive to DR effects. 
The ITI hypothesis and predictive contingencies. The evidence we have described in 
support of our ITI hypothesis pertains to operant contingency judgments. Is there any reason to 
suppose that ITIs might also be responsible for OD bias in predictive contingencies, where one 
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passively experienced event predicts the occurrence of another event? One line of evidence 
would not support this contention. Allan and Jenkins (1980, 1983) used a discrete trials 
procedure where trials were not separated by an ITI. In three experiments examining operant 
zero contingencies, no OD effects were observed. However, in Allan and Jenkins’s (1983) 
Experiment 3, participants passively observed an operant response occurring on the computer 
screen. This could therefore be regarded as a predictive contingency. In this experiment, with the 
same trial structure as the other three experiments, judgments increased substantially with higher 
levels of OD. Similarly, Vallee-Tourangeau et al. (1998) found large OD effects using a virus–
disease prediction procedure with no ITI. This suggests that OD effects occur in operant 
contingencies for different reasons than why OD effects occur in predictive contingencies, 
because in operant contingencies, at least, we found OD effects to be restricted to long ITI 
conditions. This conclusion is consistent with findings that DR effects do not occur in predictive 
tasks (e.g., Alloy et al., 1985) or when predictive judgments are made about another person’s 
control over an outcome (e.g., Martin et al., 1984). Therefore, it should be noted that the ITI 
hypothesis is so far restricted to operant contingencies. 
The Relationship Between the ITI Hypothesis and DR 
The current investigation has shown that the DR effect is not simply contingency 
dependent but ITI dependant. In a zero contingency condition, the ITI contains information that 
disconfirms the hypothesis that an individual does not control the occurrence of the outcome. 
The important question to answer is why depressed people do not integrate this information into 
their judgments. 
A depressed individual in a zero contingency “self” control situation may make 
assumptions that influence his or her processing of the information concerning the alternative 
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cause. In other words, he or she expects to have no control and pays little attention to ITI 
information that essentially disconfirms his or her hypothesis. However, fewer expectations and 
little experience in determining an “other’s” control over events might result in a tendency to use 
expectations to arrive at a judgment. We argued in the introduction that self-esteem and negative 
expectations explanations for DR may be, on their own, inadequate. Nevertheless, when one 
combines these explanations with the ITI hypothesis regarding the relevance of alternative 
causes, a more complete explanation of the data emerges. Essentially, our account of the DR 
effect suggests that expectations and motivation influence the extent to which depressed people 
process and integrate information regarding potential alternative causes into their judgments. The 
advantage of this addition is that one can then explain why DR effects are limited to high-density 
zero contingencies, but this may change with task focus. 
The idea that depressed people may to some extent ignore hypothesis-disconfirming 
information is not the only factor that might influence their integration of ITI information into 
judgments. Depressed people are known to spend considerable amounts of time ruminating about 
their feelings and the causes and consequences of their symptoms (Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1990; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003). It could be argued that self-focused (e.g., control) tasks 
with long ITIs would leave depressed people particularly susceptible to experiencing a 
depressive ruminative response during the waiting periods. Thus depressed participants’ 
attention would be focused on their ruminative thoughts as opposed to the subtle alternative 
cause or context information provided by the ITIs, producing the kind of effects we have 
observed. Although this explanation remains speculative, it certainly provides an interesting 
avenue for future research. 
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It is a widely held view that DR is inconsistent with theoretical descriptions and clinical 
observations of depressed cognition as being irrational and negatively biased (Alloy & 
Abramson, 1988). We argue that the DR effect is not inconsistent with such descriptions. We 
have found that this is due to nondepressed people integrating all the available information into 
their judgment processes. This results in judgments that are actually more consistent with the 
overall level of contingency than those of depressed people are. Depressed people’s judgments 
represent a consistent tendency to underestimate levels of contingency. Because depressed 
people’s judgments do not change when the available background data change, it could be 
argued that this is a nonnormative tendency and thus unrealistic. Yet the more conservative 
conclusion might be that both are realistic and that neither is more correct, given the ambiguity 
of the ITI. 
Conclusions 
The clinically oriented approach to depressive cognition suggests that depressed 
individuals have low expectations of control and consequently make more accurate judgments 
than nondepressed individuals do about control in any situation where the contingency is low or 
zero. This line of reasoning has been undermined by numerous studies where the DR effect only 
occurs at certain ODs (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Benassi & Mahler, 1985; Vasquez, 1987). 
Our findings on the lack of DR effects for short ITIs and low ODs add to this body of evidence. 
By contrast, our approach predicts different sizes of DR effects that are dependent on the OD and 
exposure to the ITI. Furthermore, these predictions fit well with clinical results and theories 
showing that depression influences cognitive activity and the ability to maintain attention, even 
in nonclinical populations (e.g., Farrin, Hull, Unwin, Wykes, & David, 2003). The combination 
of a theoretical approach based on learning and experimental manipulations of ITIs thus have 
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considerable potential for generating greater understanding of both normal and depressed 
thinking. 
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Appendix 
In both experiments, we found sex effects that were distinct from the ITI effects that we 
report in the main article. The analysis of the judgment-of-control data showed that the 
interaction between mood and sex was significant, F(1, 109) = 5.22, p = .024, 2 = .05, MSE = 
936.48. Four further unplanned comparisons were conducted with an alpha level adjusted to 
.0125. Nondepressed male participants (M = 43.53, SE = 6.34) made higher judgments of control 
than nondepressed female participants did (M = 25.19, SE = 5.42), F(1, 109) = 5.75, p = .018, 2 
= .02, MSE = 936.48 (although this difference just failed to reach the adjusted significance level), 
but did not differ significantly from depressed male participants (M = 33.09, SE = 4.89), F(1, 
109) = 1.86, p = .175, 2 = .006, MSE = 936.48. There were no differences between the 
judgments of the depressed female (M = 38.44, SE = 5.70) and male participants (p = .51, 2 = 
.002) and the depressed and nondepressed female participants, F(1, 109) = 2.99, p = .087, 2 = 
.01, MSE = 936.48. 
In Experiment 2, we made a similar finding. The three-way interaction between OD, 
mood, and sex was reliable, F(1, 78) = 9.03, p = .004, 2 = .10, MSE = 445.87. Although the 
Density × Mood interaction was not reliable for female participants’ judgments, F(1, 78) = 2.47, 
p = .12, 2 = .008, MSE = 445.87, it was significant for male participants’ judgments, F(1, 78) = 
6.53, p = .013, 2 = .02, MSE = 445.87. The alpha level was adjusted to .025 for further 
comparisons. Although there was no mood difference in male participants’ judgments in the low-
density condition (p = .96), nondepressed male participants made significantly higher judgments 
of control than the depressed male participants did in the high-density condition, F(1, 78) = 
10.80, p = .002, 2 = .04, MSE = 445.87. This replicates the findings of Experiment 1, which, 
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taken together, suggest that irrespective of ITI, there is a more prominent illusion of control in 
nondepressed men. 
This is in contrast to the findings of Alloy and Abramson (1979, Experiment 2), who 
found that the effect was stronger in female participants. Their explanation for this sex difference 
was based on Langer’s (1975) work, which showed that task demands for rationality 
differentially influenced male and female participants. Men were found to be less susceptible to 
illusions of control in conditions where rationality was emphasized. Alloy and Abramson argued 
that their task instructions “strongly emphasised” rationality, which may have caused this sex 
difference. In the current experiment, we used a simplified version of their instructions, which 
may also have reduced the task rationality, producing the pattern of sex effects we observed. 
Indeed, Alloy and Abramson’s Experiment 3, which de-emphasized task rationality, produced 
judgments in which men did show the illusion of control. This suggests that the sex effects 
observed in the current experiments may be consistent with previous findings and explanations 
for sex differences in contingency judgments. 
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1
Normal population refers to random samples drawn from the normal population in 
studies where depressed mood was not a variable of interest. 
2Alloy and Abramson’s “depressed” participants did not receive a clinical diagnosis of 
depression. All participants completed the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, 
Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) and were assigned to depressed or nondepressed groups on 
the basis of criteria proposed by Beck et al. The criteria were such that participants scoring 8 or 
less on the BDI were categorized as nondepressed, whereas those scoring 9 or above were 
categorized as mildly depressed. Therefore, Alloy and Abramson’s depressed participants might 
be more correctly described as dysphoric. In this article, for the sake of simplicity, the term 
depression will be used to indicate dysphoria. Studies using dysphoric participants will be 
referred to as analogue studies and those using clinically depressed participants will be referred 
to as clinical studies. 
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Figure 1. The effect of adding 40 intertrial intervals (ITIs) as D cells into low- and high-
density zero contingency conditions. The upper panel shows the traiditional P calculations, and 
the lower panel shows how incorporating ITIs into the contingency table changes the P.  
Figure 2. Mean judgments of control in a high-density zero contingency condition as a 
function of mood and length of intertrial interval (ITI). Error bars correspond to the standard 
error of the mean. 
Figure 3. Mean judgments of control in a zero contingency condition as a function of 
intertrial interval (ITI) length, outcome density, and mood. Error bars correspond with the 
standard error of the mean. ND = nondepressed; D = depressed; low = low density; high = high 
density. 
Figure 4. Asymptotic predictions of the Rescorla–Wagner model for conditions with no 
intertrial interval (ITI) and long ITIs, with zero and positive (pos) contingencies and conditions 
of low and high outcome density. The frequencies of events in zero contingency conditions are 
the same as those reported in Figure 1. The event frequencies in the positive contingency 
conditions were as follows (Cells A, B, C, D, respectively): low-density positive, 10, 10, 0, 20; 
high-density positive, 20, 0, 10, 10. ITIs were conceptualized as 40 context–no outcome trials 
and the alpha level, 1, and 0 were all set to .02. Solid lines show the associative strength of the 
response and broken lines show the associative strength of the context. 
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Table 1  
Three 2 x 2 contingency tables showing the four possible combinations of response - outcome information. The 
upper table shows generic information from which P is calculated, where A, B, C and D refer to the frequencies of 
such information.  
 Outcome 
Response Present Absent 
Present A B 
Absent C D 
 
P = 0 
Low outcome density 
 P = 0 
High outcome density 
 
Response 
Outcome  
Response 
Outcome  
Present Absent Present Absent 
Present 5 15 
P(O/R) = 
0.25 
Present 15 5 
P(O/R) = 
0.75 
Absent 5 15 
P(O/noR) = 
0.25 
Absent 15 5 
P(O/noR) = 
0.75 
 
Note: Contingency = P = A/A+B – C/C+D. The two lower tables show examples of two contingency conditions in 
which delta P is zero, with a low outcome density condition on the left and a high outcome density condition on the 
right. Note - P(O/R) refers to the conditional probability of the outcome given the presence of the response and 
P(O/noR) refers to the conditional probability of the outcome given the absence of the response. 
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Table 2  
 Analysis of variance for the judgement of control data in Experiment 2. 
  
Source df F 2 p 
Nart 1 14.01*** .15 <.001 
Education 1 1.44 .02 .234 
Density 1 4.20* .05 .044 
Mood 1 1.85 .02 .178 
Sex 1 .49 .02 .487 
ITI 1 .02 .00 .881 
Density x mood 1 .68 .02 .414 
Density x sex 1 .48 .01 .491 
Mood x sex 1 3.68 .05 .059 
Density x mood x sex 1 9.03** .10 .004 
Density x ITI 1 5.26* .06 .024 
Mood x ITI 1 6.55* .08 .012 
Density x mood x ITI 1 4.27* .05 .042 
Sex x ITI 1 .02 .00 .879 
Density x sex x ITI 1 .78 .01 .381 
Mood x sex x ITI 1 .02 .00 .894 
Density x mood x sex x ITI 1 3.50 .04 .065 
Within group error 78 (445.87)   
 Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p <.001. 
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Table 3 
Mean judgements of control as a function of outcome density, mood, sex and ITI length  
Outcome density Mood Sex ITI Mean SE 
Low 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-depressed 
 
 
 
F Short 20.25 8.95 
 Long 25.10 8.68 
M Short 33.57 8.84 
 Long 14.52 8.84 
Depressed 
 
 
 
F Short 24.17 8.63 
 Long 7.03 8.63 
M Short 29.34 8.82 
 Long 23.43 8.70 
High 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-depressed 
 
 
 
F Short 15.56 8.80 
 Long 34.90 8.63 
M Short 24.86 8.66 
 Long 68.44 8.64 
Depressed 
 
 
 
F Short 40.55 8.64 
 Long 33.53 8.24 
M Short 22.41 8.73 
 Long 9.13 9.59 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
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